Beyond Inflation Targeting

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Inflation targeting

• "the public announcement of inflation targets, coupled with a **credible** and **accountable** commitment on the part of government policy authorities to the achievement of these targets"

"full fledged" inflation targeting consists of:

- absence of other nominal anchors, such as exchange rates or nominal GDP;
- an institutional commitment to price stability;
- absence of fiscal dominance;
- policy (instrument) independence; and
- policy transparency and accountability

The key problem is that

 much evidence has now been accumulated that the globalization of finance has become an underlying source of instability and unpredictability in the world economy.

• price stability, on its own, may not suffice to maintain macroeconomic stability, as it may not suffice to secure *financial stability*.

The idea of equilibrium: The Savings – Investment Balance

$$\max_{0} \int_{0}^{\infty} U(c_{t})dt$$

Subject to:

$$PC + a_t = wL + ra_{t-1}$$

$$Q = f(K, L)$$


The producer maximizes profits (the difference between revenues PQ and costs of labour and capital, wL ve rK).

Thus, for producers the problem is to:

Max Pf(K,L) - wL - rK

a-2-K





- •Microfoundations story where investment is passive and savings-driven is far from reality.
- •Mathematical elegance of the Hamiltonian arithmetics of pleasure fails to model realities of the economic phenomena.
- •Asset manias and bubbles are more than a possibility (Kindleberger)

Macroeconomic Record

the currency crises of the 1990s have underscored the need for *avoiding* overvalued exchange rates.

even under flexible exchange rate regimes, the exchange rate may become misaligned, if its actual value exhibits a sustained departure from that rate which is compatible with the internal and external equilibrium.


The Un-Holy Trilemma

A Central Bank can choose only two of the following policy regimes:

•exchange rate regime

•monetary policy rule • external capital mobility

Regard the trilemma in a continuous fashion:



Alternatives to Inflation Targeting

(Gerald Epstein and Robert Pollin, among others)

- Why target inflation? Employment? Exports? Current account?
- Targeting real exchange rate (post crisis Latin American experience, Roberto Frenkel, Jaime Ros, Lance Taylor...)

Alternatives to the Instrument

Use the Pasinetti Rule (Setterfield)

Set the interest rate to the rate of growth of labor productivity

Why targeting "as low as possible rate of inflation"?

- Pollin and Zhu (2006) report that higher inflation is associated with moderate gains in GDP growth up to a roughly 8 – 10 percent inflation threshold.
- They found no justification to maintain inflation within a 3 5 percent band throughout the middle- and low-income countries.

Lessons, lessons for a good listener

- •not only the domestic, but also the global economy is in need of management and regulation
- •the business cycle is driven by shifts in the savings investment balance
- •both the current level of economic activity and growth are driven from demand side with endogenous labor productivity growth (Kaldor)

- policy recommendations based on static comparative advantage calculations are misleading and bad advice
- •development warrants not doing more of the same thing more intensively, but diversification into producing things up in the ladder of industrialization (Rodrik, Ha Joon-Chang)

•Exchange rate might be in spot market equilibrium but may suffer from *structural misalignment* (Edwards)

•even under flexible exchange rate regimes, the exchange rate may become misaligned,

if its actual value exhibits a sustained departure from that rate which is compatible with the *internal and external equilibrium*.

 over-obsession with fiscal sustainability while neglecting balance of payments sustainability is a dangerous game

In fact,

• "...the source of macroeconomic instability now is not instability in product markets but asset markets, and the main challenge for policy makers is not inflation, but unemployment and financial instability".

Akyüz (2006)

"the argument that 'this time things are different' is a statement that can only be made by fools that fail to take any lessons from history..."

Kenneth Rogoff, IMF Chief Economist, 2005